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Introduction
Government subsidies are a common phenomenon in professional team sports.
ese subsidies usually take the form of advantageous property deals,1 tax loopholes,2
and low or zero stadium rents.3 As a result of these subsidies, some clubs enjoy cost
advantages over their competitors.
A special case of these cost advantages are income tax diﬀerences with respect to
player salaries. In France, there is a uniform income tax rate. As a result, players in
the first French division face an income tax rate of 45% if their salary exceeds
€150,000. Monaco, on the other hand, does not impose income taxes. Accordingly,
players from AS Monaco, who also compete in the first French division, do not pay
any income taxes.
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Abstract
This article develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of subsidies on
player salaries, competitive balance, club profits, and welfare. Within this model, fan
demand depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent. The
results show that if a large-market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively
strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to competitive balance and own
team winning percentage, club profits and welfare increase for both clubs. If the
small-market club is subsidized, a small subsidy increases competitive balance and
player salaries of both clubs.
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